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Abstract
We present a procedure which allows us to recover classical and non-
classical logical structures as concrete logics associated with physical the-
ories expressed by means of classical languages. This procedure consists in
choosing, for a given theory T and classical language L expressing T , an
observative sublanguage L of L with a notion of truth as correspondence,
introducing in L a derived and theory–dependent notion of C–truth (true
with certainty), defining a physical preorder induced by C–truth, and fi-
nally selecting a set of sentences that are verifiable (or testable) according
to T , on which a weak complementation is induced by T . The triple
consisting of the set of verifiable sentences, physical order and weak com-
plementation is then the desired concrete logic. By applying our procedure
we recover a classical logic as the concrete logic associated with classical
mechanics and standard quantum logic as the concrete logic associated
with quantum mechanics. We also show that our alternative view of stan-
dard quantum logic, which can be constructed in a purely formal way, can
be provided with a physical meaning by adopting a recent interpretation
of quantum mechanics that reinterprets quantum probabilities as condi-
tional on detection rather than absolute. Our results then show that some
nonstandard logics can be obtained as mathematical structures formaliz-
ing the properties of different notions of verifiability in different physical
theories. More generally, they strongly support the idea that many non-
classical logics can coexist without conflicting with classical logic (global
pluralism), for they formalize metalinguistic notions that do not coincide
with the notion of truth (described by Tarski’s truth theory).
1 Introduction
After the birth of modern formal logic in the XIX century many nonstandard
logics were proposed, from Heyting’s intuitionistic logic [1, 2] and  Lukasiewicz’s
many valued logic [3] to the recent relevance logic [4, 5] and linear logic [6].
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In many cases these logics are interpreted as formalizing the features of
notions of truth that are alternative to the classical notion of truth as corre-
spondence formalized by Tarski [7, 8], and many logicians maintain that the
plurality of logics should be considered as an important achievement of the XX
century, which parallels the plurality of geometries which constitutes one of the
revolutionary results of the mathematical research in the XIX century. Other
logicians and philosophers instead uphold the thesis that nonstandard logics can
be recovered as fragments of a suitable extension of classical logic (CL), in a
unified view (global pluralism) which restores the unity of logic and avoids many
quarrels about the notion of truth [9, 10]. In this perspective, for instance, it has
been proven that intuitionistic logic can be recovered as a part of a pragmatic
extension of CL, intended to formalize the features of the notion of logical proof
rather than the properties of an intuitionistic nonclassical notion of truth [11].
In the physical realm, many nonstandard logics were propounded after the
birth of quantum mechanics (QM) [12]. One only of them, however, acquired
growing importance in the literature, that is, the quantum logic (QL) pro-
pounded by Birkhoff and von Neumann [13] as the underlying logic of QM, now
often called standard (sharp) QL. This proposal indeed become rather popu-
lar because it seems to spring out directly from the mathematical formalism
of QM. Moreover, many scholars maintain that some known paradoxes of QM
could follow from an improper use of CL for dealing with the basic notions of
QM, for this theory would implicitly introduce a nonclassical notion of truth
(here, briefly, quantum truth, or Q–truth) whose features are formalized by stan-
dard QL [14, 15]. Hence a huge literature was produced on this topic, which is
still flourishing nowadays.
Also in the specific case of standard QL, however, one may wonder whether
a perspective of global pluralism can be adopted which allows one to recover
standard QL within an extended classical framework. In particular, it has been
asserted several years ago that standard QL could be seen as the mathemat-
ical structure resulting from selecting a subset of sentences that are testable
according to QM in the set of all sentences of a suitable classical language,
that is, as the structure formalizing the features of the metalinguistic notion of
testability in QM rather than a notion of Q–truth [16]. The aim of the present
paper is to generalize and implement this view. To be precise we intend to illus-
trate a procedure for obtaining a concrete (theory–dependent) logic associated
with a physical theory T expressed by means of a classical language L with a
(Tarskian) notion of truth as correspondence. This procedure consists of four
steps.
(i) Consider an observational sublanguage L of L and introduce a derived
notion of true with certainty on L (C–truth), defined in terms of classical truth
but depending on T .
(ii) Define a physical preorder ≺ on L, induced by the notion of C–truth.
(iii) Introduce a notion of verifiability in L by selecting a subset φV of sen-
tences of L that are verifiable, or testable, according to T .
(iv) Define a weak complementation ⊥ induced by T on (φV ,≺).
The structure (φV ,≺,
⊥) is then the required concrete logic.
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The above procedure is conceptually and philosophically relevant because it
can explain the origins of some important nonstandard logics. Indeed one can
obtain different concrete logics by changing some of the three basic elements of
the procedure, that is, T , L and the notion of verification.
We illustrate our procedure in Secs. 2 and 3 by introducing a very simple
observational (pretheoretical) language L(x) which is suitable for expressing ba-
sic notions and relations in a wide class of physical theories. Then we consider
two fundamental theories of modern physics, i.e., classical mechanics (CM) and
QM. We obtain in Sec. 4 a classical logical structure as the concrete logic asso-
ciated with CM if all sentences of L(x) are considered verifiable (in principle),
as usual in CM. But we also prove by means of an example in Sec. 5 that one
can obtain a concrete logic that exhibits a non–Boolean lattice structure in a
macroscopic domain in which CM holds if one selects a suitable language L and
subset of sentences of L that are considered verifiable. Furthermore, we show in
Sec. 6 that, if T is QM, our procedure allows one to recover standard QL as the
concrete logic associated with QM (up to an equivalence relation) if a standard
notion of verifiability according to QM is adopted. Finally we compare in the
last part of the paper (Sec. 7) our procedure for obtaining standard QL with
the orthodox procedure that introduces standard QL without making reference
to classical truth [14, 15], and show that the latter implies adopting implicitly
a verificationist (hence theory dependent) definition of truth, while truth and
verification are carefully distinguished in our approach.
Let us add now some comments and remarks on the results resumed above.
Firstly, we observe that our approach does not conflict with logical localism
[17], for it entails that many nonstandard logics can be obtained, depending
both on the theory T and on the notion of verifiability that is considered.
Nevertheless it also supports global pluralism, because it implies that different
concrete logics can coexist without contradicting classical logic.
Secondly, we note that our procedure has to cope with an important objec-
tion. Indeed, a quantum physicist could argue that it recovers standard QL in
a classical framework in a purely formal way because QM cannot be expressed
by a classical language. More specifically, he would observe that we associate
a set with every property of a physical system (the extension of the property)
whose elements are interpreted as individual examples of the system possessing
the property, while such a set cannot be defined according to the orthodox inter-
pretation of QM. Physical properties are in fact nonobjective according to this
interpretation, which means that the set of individual examples of the physical
system in a given state that display a given property whenever this property
is measured depends on the set of measurements that are actually performed
and is not prefixed (hence one cannot say that these examples “possess” the
property before the measurement). To overcome this objection, we preliminar-
ily note that our formal derivation of standard QL is interesting anyway, for it is
usually maintained that any derivation of this kind is impossible. More impor-
tant, the objection vanishes if one accepts the point of view of some alternative
interpretations of QM in which objectivity of physical properties is recovered.
In particular, an extensive criticism of the theorems that aim to prove the con-
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textuality and the nonlocality of QM (mainly the Bell–Kochen–Specker [18, 19]
and the Bell [20] theorems), hence nonobjectivity of physical properties, has
been carried out by some authors who have shown that the proofs of these the-
orems implicitly introduce an epistemological assumption which is problematic
from the point of view of QM. If this assumption is relaxed, the proofs cannot
be completed [21, 22, 23]. Basing on this conclusion, a new theoretical proposal
called extended semantic realism (ESR) model has been recently worked out.
The ESR model reinterprets quantum probabilities as conditional on detection
rather than absolute and embodies the mathematical formalism of QM into a
broader formalism which admits a local and noncontextual physical interpre-
tation [24, 25, 26], recovering objectivity of physical properties. If this new
perspective is accepted, our present deduction of standard QL is not purely
formal because its basic elements are provided with a physical interpretation.
Thirdly, we note that we recover standard QL in this paper by introducing
semantic restrictions induced by QM on a classical language and then defining
new derived quantum connectives whose semantic interpretation is provided by
QM. It is then possible to show that an equivalent approach to standard QL
can be constructed by pragmatically extending a classical propositional logic by
means of pragmatic connectives, following [11], and then interpreting these con-
nectives in terms of the quantum notion of empirical proof (which is equivalent
to the notion of verification according to QM that is introduced in this paper).
We conclude by noticing that the elementary observational sublanguage L(x)
introduced in this paper takes into account only pure states and physical prop-
erties (exact effects) and does not contain logical quantifiers, to avoid clouding
the conceptual aspects of our approach with technical complications. In princi-
ple, however, it can be extended to take into account mixtures and effects and
express general empirical laws.
2 The language L(x)
Let T be a physical theory in which the following notions are introduced [27, 28].
Physical system.
Physical property of a physical system, operationally defined as a class of di-
chotomic registering devices that are physically equivalent according to T .
Physical state of a physical system, operationally defined as a class of preparing
devices that are physically equivalent according to T .
Physical object, operationally defined as an individual example of a physical
system, prepared by means of a preparing device.
We denote by L(x) a formal language intended to express basic notions and
relations in T , constructed as follows.
Def. 2.1. The alphabet of L(x) consists of the following elements.
Two disjoint sets of monadic predicates, E = {E,F, . . .} (intended interpreta-
tion: physical properties) and S = {S, T, . . .} (intended interpretation: pure
states).
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Individual variable x.
Connectives ¬,∧,∨,→.
Parentheses ( , ).
Def. 2.2. The set ψ(x) of all well formed formulas (wffs) of L(x) is the set
obtained by applying recursively standard formation rules in CL (to be precise,
for every A ∈ E ∪S , A(x) ∈ ψ(x); for every α(x) ∈ ψ(x), ¬α(x) ∈ ψ(x); for
every α(x), β(x) ∈ ψ(x), α(x)∧β(x) ∈ ψ(x), α(x)∨β(x) ∈ ψ(x), α(x)→ β(x) ∈
ψ(x)). Furthermore, we put E(x) = {E(x) | E ∈ E}, S (x) = {S(x) | S ∈ S }
and call E(x) ∪S (x) the set of all atomic wffs of ψ(x).
Def. 2.3. The semantics of L(x) consists of the following elements.
Universe U (intended interpretation: set of physical objects).
Injective mapping ext : A ∈ E ∪S 7−→ ext(A) ∈ P(U) (power set of U).
Boolean lattice 〈ext(E ∪S )〉 generated by ext(E ∪S ) via c,∩,∪.
Recursive definition of the surjective mapping (still called ext by abuse of lan-
guage)
ext : α(x) ∈ ψ(x) 7−→ ext(α(x)) ∈ 〈ext(E ∪S )〉
(to be precise, for every E ∈ E, ext(E(x)) = ext(E); for every S ∈ S ,
ext(S(x)) = ext(S); for every α(x) ∈ ψ(x), ext(¬α(x)) = U \ ext(α(x)) =
(ext(α(x)))c; for every α(x), β(x) ∈ ψ(x), ext(α(x) ∧ β(x)) = ext(α(x)) ∩
ext(β(x)), ext(α(x) ∨ β(x)) = ext(α(x)) ∪ ext(β(x)), ext(α(x) → β(x)) =
(ext(α(x)))c ∪ ext(β(x))).
Interpretation of the variable σ : x ∈ {x} 7−→ σ(x) ∈ U .
Set Σ of all interpretations of the variable.
For every σ ∈ Σ, truth assignment
vσ : α(x) ∈ ψ(x) 7−→ vσ(α(x)) ∈ {T, F}
such that vσ(α(x)) = T (F ) iff σ(x) ∈ ext(α(x)) (σ(x) ∈ (ext(α(x)))
c).
Definition of truth (falsity): for every α(x) ∈ ψ(x), α(x) is true ( false) in σ iff
vσ(α(x)) = T (F ).
Def. 2.4. The binary relations of logical preorder ≤ and logical equivalence ≡
on ψ(x) are defined by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ ψ(x),
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff (for every σ ∈ Σ, vσ(α(x)) = T implies vσ(β(x)) = T )
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff (for every σ ∈ Σ, vσ(α(x)) = T iff vσ(β(x)) = T ).
One can then prove some statements that are useful to compare the logical
notions introduced in this section with the physical notions introduced in the
following sections.
Prop. 2.1. (i) ext(ψ(x)) = 〈ext(E∪S )〉, hence (ext(ψ(x)),∩,∪, c) is a Boolean
algebra; equivalently, (ext(ψ(x)),⊂, c) is a Boolean lattice.
(ii) For every α(x), β(x) ∈ ψ(x),
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Fig. 1.
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff ext(α(x)) ⊂ ext(β(x))
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff (α(x) ≤ β(x) and β(x) ≤ α(x)) iff ext(α(x)) = ext(β(x)).
(iii) The equivalence relation ≡ is compatible with ¬,∧,∨ and → (that is,
for every α(x), β(x), γ(x), δ(x) ∈ ψ(x), α(x) ≡ β(x) implies ¬α(x) ≡ ¬β(x),
(α(x) ≡ γ(x) and β(x) ≡ δ(x)) implies α(x) ∧ β(x) ≡ γ(x) ∧ δ(x), etc.).
(iv) The structure (ψ(x)/≡,∧
′,∨′,¬′) (where ∧′,∨′,¬′ denote the opera-
tions canonically induced on ψ(x)/≡ by ∧,∨,¬, respectively) is a Boolean al-
gebra isomorphic to (ext(ψ(x)),∩,∪, c) (Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of L(x));
equivalently, (ψ(x)/≡,≤
′,¬′) (where ≤′ is the order canonically induced on
ψ(x)/≡ by the preorder ≤ defined on ψ(x)) is a Boolean lattice isomorphic to
(ext(ψ(x)),⊂, c).
3 General physical conditions on L(x)
The notions introduced in this section hold for any physical theory T of the
kind considered at the beginning of Sec. 2, are suggested by the intended
interpretation of L(x) and are partially illustrated by the drawing in Fig. 1.
For the sake of brevity we shall understand the word “pure” when referring to
states in the following.
Axiom P. {ext(S) | S ∈ S } is a partition of U .
Physical justification. States are defined as equivalence classes of preparations
(Sec. 2) and every physical object in U is prepared by one and only one prepa-
ration, hence it belongs to one and only one extension of a state.
The following statement is then an immediate consequence of Axiom P.
Prop. 3.1. For every σ ∈ Σ, there is one and only one state Sσ ∈ S such that
σ(x) ∈ ext(Sσ) (equivalently, vσ(Sσ(x)) = T ).
In a physical theory T of the kind considered in Sec. 2 it is customary to
associate every physical property E with a set of states SE such that, if a
physical object x is prepared by a preparing device belonging to the state S ∈
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SE , then x displays the property E with certainty whenever a measurement of
E is performed. The following definition generalizes this idea.
Def. 3.1. We denote by φ(x) the subset of wffs of ψ(x) which are constructed by
using only atomic wffs in E(x), hence do not contain predicates denoting states.
Then, for every α(x) ∈ φ(x), we call physical proposition associated with α(x)
the set of states
pα = {S ∈ S | ext(S) ⊂ ext(α(x))}
and denote by P the set of all physical propositions associated with wffs of φ(x).
The proof of the following statement is then straightforward.
Prop. 3.2 For every α(x) ∈ φ(x),
pα = {S ∈ S | for every σ ∈ Σ, vσ(S(x)→ α(x)) = T }.
By using the notion of physical proposition one can define a notion of C–truth
on φ(x) (which depends on T because, for every α(x) ∈ φ(x), the set of states
in the physical proposition pα depends on T ).
Def. 3.2. For every α(x) ∈ φ(x), let us denote by p¬α the physical proposition
associated with ¬α(x). Then, for every S ∈ S , we say that α(x) is C–true
( certainly true) in S iff S ∈ pα, C–false ( certainly false) in S iff S ∈ p¬α. Fur-
thermore, we say that α(x) has no C–truth value (or that it is C–indeterminate)
iff S /∈ pα ∪ p¬α.
One can then easily prove the following statement.
Prop. 3.3. For every S ∈ S and α(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) is C–true in S iff ext(S) ⊂ ext(α(x)) iff (for every σ ∈ Σ, S(x) is true in
σ implies α(x) is true in σ) iff for every σ ∈ Σ, vσ(S(x)→ α(x)) = T ,
and
α(x) is C–false in S iff ext(S) ⊂ (ext(α(x)))c iff (for every σ ∈ Σ, S(x) is true
in σ implies ¬α(x) is true in σ) iff for every σ ∈ Σ, vσ(S(x)→ ¬α(x)) = T .
By using the notion of C–truth one can introduce new binary relations on φ(x),
as follows.
Def. 3.3. We call physical preorder ≺ and physical equivalence ≈ the binary
relations defined on φ(x) by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) ≺ β(x) iff (for every S ∈ S , α(x) is C–true in S implies β(x) is C–true
in S)
and
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff (for every S ∈ S , α(x) is C–true in S iff β(x) is C–true in S).
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Furthermore, we denote by ≺′ the order canonically induced on φ(x)/≈ by the
preorder ≺ defined on φ(x).
The proofs of the following statements are then straightforward.
Prop. 3.4. (i) For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) ≺ β(x) iff pα ⊂ pβ
and
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff pα = pβ iff (α(x) ≺ β(x) and β(x) ≺ α(x)).
(ii) (φ(x)/≈,≺
′) is isomorphic to (P ,⊂).
(iii) Let α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x). Then
α(x) ≤ β(x) implies α(x) ≺ β(x)
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) implies α(x) ≈ β(x).
We observe now that the intended interpretation of L(x) implies that a wff
α(x) ∈ φ(x) can be verified whenever a dichotomic registering device exists
which, for every σ ∈ Σ, may perform a measurement on σ(x) specifying whether
α(x) is true or false in σ. But a dichotomic registering device of this kind
characterizes a physical property E in the theory T (Sec. 2), hence we are led
to introduce the following definition.
Def. 3.4. We call set of verifiable, or testable, wffs of L(x) the subset
φV (x) = {α(x) ∈ φ(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E : α(x) ≡ Eα(x)} ⊂ φ(x)
and call set of verifiable, or testable, propositions of L(x) the subset
PV = {pα ∈ P | α(x) ∈ φV (x)} ⊂ P.
Basing on Def. 3.4 one can prove at once the following statements.
Prop. 3.5. (i) φV (x) = {α(x) ∈ φ(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E : ext(α(x)) = ext(Eα(x))}.
(ii) The following order structures and isomorphisms can be introduced bas-
ing on the logical and physical orders.
(φ(x),≤).
(φ(x)/≡,≤
′), isomorphic to (ext(φ(x)),⊂).
(φV (x),≤).
(φV (x)/≡,≤
′), isomorphic to (ext(E),⊂).
(φ(x),≺).
(φ(x)/≈,≺
′), isomorphic to (P ,⊂).
(φV (x),≺).
(φV (x)/≈,≺
′), isomorphic to (PV ,⊂).
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Fig. 2.
The crucial notion of logic associated with a physical theory T , distinguished
from (but related to) the logical structure of the language by means of which T
is expressed, can now be introduced by means of the following definition.
Def. 3.5. Whenever the theory T induces a weak complementation ⊥ on
(φV (x),≺) ( i.e., a mapping
⊥ : α(x) ∈ φV (x) 7−→ (α(x))
⊥ ∈ φV (x) such that
(α(x))⊥⊥ ≈ α(x) and α(x) ≺ β(x) implies (β(x))⊥ ≺ (α(x))⊥) we say that the
set (φV (x),≺,
⊥) is the concrete logic of T .
We stress that the set φV (x) is selected by adopting a standard notion of verifi-
cation that holds both in CM and in QM. Of course, different choices of φV (x)
may lead one to associate different concrete logics with T .
4 Classical mechanics and classical logic
We intend to show in this section that the concrete logic of CM within the
general classical approach sketched in Secs. 2 and 3 has the structure of a
classical logic. To this end we preliminarily state the following fundamental
axiom of CM, which establishes the mathematical representation of states and
physical properties in CM.
Axiom CM1. Every physical system is represented in CM by a triple (F , ϕ, χ),
where F , ϕ and χ are defined as follows.
F is a phase space associated with the physical system Ω.
ϕ : S ∈ S 7−→ ϕ(S) ∈ F .
χ : E ∈ E 7−→ χ(E) ∈ P(F)
where P(F) is the power set of F .
The mappings ϕ and χ are bijective.
We introduce now two axioms that can be justified in CM on the basis of the
intended interpretation provided in Sec. 2. The first of them relates the math-
ematical representation in Axiom CM1 with the set–theoretical representations
of states and physical properties provided in Sec. 2.
Axiom CM2. For every E ∈ E and S ∈ S ,
ϕ(S) ∈ χ(E) iff ext(S) ⊂ ext(E),
ϕ(S) ∈ F \ χ(E) iff ext(S) ⊂ U \ ext(E).
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Physical justification. All physical objects in a given state (that is, prepared
by preparations that are physically equivalent in the sense established by CM)
either possess or do not possess a given physical property according to CM.
By using Axiom CM2 one can easily prove the following statements (which
are partially illustrated by the drawing in Fig. 2).
Prop. 4.1. (i) For every E ∈ E and S ∈ S , either ext(S) ⊂ ext(E) or
ext(S) ⊂ U \ ext(E) = (ext(E))c.
(ii) For every α(x) ∈ φ(x) and S ∈ S , either ext(S) ⊂ ext(α(x)) or
ext(S) ⊂ U \ ext(α(x)) = (ext(α(x)))c (hence ext(α(x)) = ∪{ext(S) | ext(S) ⊂
ext(α(x))}.
(iii) For every σ ∈ Σ and α(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) is true (false) in σ iff α(x) is C–true (C–false) in Sσ
iff ext(Sσ) ⊂ ext(α(x)) (ext(Sσ) ⊂ (ext(α(x)))
c) iff Sσ ∈ pα (Sσ ∈ S \ pα).
(iv) For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff α(x) ≺ β(x)
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff α(x) ≈ β(x).
It is important to note that Prop. 4.1, (iii), shows that truth and C–truth
coincide in CM. Indeed this coincidence explains why no distinction between
the two notions of truth is made in CM.
The last axiom then characterizes the notion of verification in CM.
Axiom CM3. The set φV (x) of all verifiable wffs of φ(x) coincides with φ(x).
Physical justification. All physical statements about physical objects are testable,
in principle, according to CM.
By using Axiom CM3 one can easily prove the following statements.
Prop. 4.2. (i) For every σ ∈ Σ and α(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) is true (false) in σ iff Eα(x) is true (false) in σ iff ext(Sσ) ⊂ ext(Eα)
(ext(Sσ) ⊂ (ext(Eα))
c).
(ii) For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff Eα(x) ≤ Eβ(x),
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff Eα(x) ≡ Eβ(x).
(iii) (φ(x),≤), (φV (x),≤), (φ(x),≺) and (φV (x),≺) can be identified.
(iv) (φ(x)/≡,≤
′), (φV (x)/≡,≤
′), (φ(x)/≈,≺
′) and (φV (x)/≈,≺
′) can be
identified. Furthermore, they are isomorphic to (ext(φ(x)),⊂), (ext(E),⊂),
(P ,⊂) and (PV ,⊂).
(v) The mapping
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⊥ : α(x) ∈ φV (x) 7−→ ¬α(x) ∈ φV (x)
is a weak complementation on (φV (x),≺).
(vi) The structure (φV (x),≺,
⊥) is the concrete logic of CM and (φV (x)/≈,≺
′,⊥
′
)
(where ⊥
′
is the complementation canonically induced by ⊥ on φV (x)/≡) is a
Boolean lattice that can be identified with the Boolean algebra (φV (x)/≡,∧
′,∨′,¬′).
The result in Prop. 4.2, (vi), explains from our present standpoint the common
statement in the literature that “the logic of a classical physical system is clas-
sical logic”. We stress, however, that this statement follows from Axioms CM2
and CM3 and could not be proven if these axioms should not hold.
For the sake of completeness we add the following statements, which establish
further links between the mathematical representation in Axiom CM1 and the
set–theoretical representations of states and physical properties provided in Sec.
2.
Prop. 4.3. (i) For every E,F ∈ E,
χ(E) ⊂ χ(F ) iff ext(E) ⊂ ext(F ).
(ii) For every σ ∈ Σ and α(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) is true (false) in σ iff ϕ(Sσ) ∈ χ(Eα) (ϕ(Sσ) ∈ F \ χ(Eα)).
(iii) For every α(x) ∈ φ(x),
pα = {S ∈ S | ϕ(S) ∈ χ(Eα)}.
5 Non–Boolean structures in classical mechan-
ics
Prop. 4.2, (vi), states that (φV (x)/≈,≺
′,⊥
′
) is a Boolean lattice in CM which
can be identified with the Boolean algebra (φ(x)/≡,∧
′,∨′,¬′). It is then im-
portant to observe that non–Boolean algebras can be obtained in CM if the
testability criteria are suitably restricted. For instance, let us assume that not
all wffs in φV (x), which are testable in principle, are testable in practice, and
let us introduce the subset φPV (x) ⊂ φV (x) of wffs of L(x) that are practically
testable. In this case we can consider the preordered set (φPV (x),≤) and the
quotient set (φPV (x)/≡,≤
′). Yet, the latter generally is not a Boolean lattice,
and it can be equipped with different algebraic structures by choosing φPV (x) in
different ways [16].
It is also interesting to note that there are examples in the literature of
physical systems in which quantum structures are obtained in a macroscopic
domain in which CM holds. These examples are relevant because they falsify
the widespread belief that QL characterizes QM, hence indirectly support our
position in this paper. Let us therefore present briefly one of them, that is,
Aerts’ quantum machine [29, 30, 31, 32].
Aerts writes in [32]:
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“The machine that we consider consists of a physical entity S that is
a point particle P that can move on the surface of a sphere, denoted
surf , with center O and radius 1. The unit–vector v where the par-
ticle is located on surf represents the state pv of the particle (. . . ).
For each point u ∈ surf , we introduce the following measurement
eu. We consider the diametrically opposite point −u, and install
a piece of elastic of length 2, such that it is fixed with one of its
end–points in u and the other end–point in −u. Once the elastic is
installed, the particle P falls from its original place v orthogonally
onto the elastic, and sticks on it (. . . ). Then the elastic breaks and
the particle P , attached to one of the two pieces of the elastic (. . . ),
moves to one of the two end–points u or −u (. . . ). Depending on
whether the particle P arrives in u (. . . ) or in −u, we give the
outcome ou
1
or ou
2
to eu. We can easily calculate the probabilities
corresponding to the two possible outcomes. Therefore we remark
that the particle P arrives in u when the elastic breaks in a point
of the interval L1 (which is the length of the piece of the elastic be-
tween −u and the point where the particle has arrived, or 1+cos θ),
[where θ is the angle between u and v] and arrives in −u when it
breaks in a point of the interval L2 (L2 = L − L1 = 2 − L1). We
make the hypothesis that the elastic breaks uniformly, which means
that the probability that the particle, being in state pv, arrives in u,
is given by the length of L1 divided by the length of the total elastic
(which is 2). The probability that the particle in state pv arrives
in −u is the length of L2 (which is 1 − cos θ) divided by the length
of the total elastic. If we denote these probabilities respectively by
P (ou
1
, pv) and P (o
u
2
, pv) we have:
P (ou
1
, pv) =
1 + cos θ
2
= cos2
θ
2
P (ou
2
, pv) =
1− cos θ
2
= sin2
θ
2
These transition probabilities are the same as the ones related to the
outcomes of a Stern–Gerlach spin measurement on a spin 1
2
quantum
particle, . . . ”.
Therefore Aerts concludes:
“We can easily see now the two aspects in this quantum machine
that we have identified in the hidden measurement approach to give
rise to the quantum structure. The state of the particle P is effec-
tively changed by the measuring apparatus (pv changes to pu or to
p−u under the influence of the measuring process), which identifies
the first aspect, and there is a lack of knowledge on the interaction
between the measuring apparatus and the particle, namely the lack
of knowledge of were exactly the elastic will break, which identi-
fies the second aspect. We can also easily understand now what is
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meant by the term ‘hidden measurements’. Each time the elastic
breaks in one specific point λ, we could identify the measurement
process that is carried out afterwards as a hidden measurement eλu.
The measurement eu is then a classical mixture of the collection of
all measurement eλu: namely eu consists of choosing at random one
of the eλu and performing this chosen e
λ
u.”
Let us qualitatively discuss the above example from the point of view pro-
posed in the present paper. It follows from Aerts’ description that the physical
system that is considered is a classical particle P of which a complete determin-
istic description is possible, in principle, in CM. But Aerts introduces hidden
variables (the parameter λ) in his measurement processes. Hence the observative
sublanguage L of the general language L describing this class of systems (Sec.
1) must contain terms interpreted on unsharp properties (or effects), which can
be considered in CM as derived entities, defined by generalizing the standard
notion of physical property. Thus one can construct L by enlarging L(x) by
means of predicates denoting unsharp properties (for which Axiom CM2 does
not hold, hence the physical preorder does not coincide with the logical preorder
in L). It is then apparent that Aerts considers as verifiable sentences of L only
sentences that are logically equivalent to atomic sentences containing predicates
that denote unsharp properties. This implies that the concrete logic that is ob-
tained in this case is not a Boolean algebra. Indeed, Aerts’ results entail that
it is isomorphic to the QL of a spin– 1
2
quantum particle, hence to the modular
orthocomplemented lattice of all subspaces of C2.
Our informal discussion of this example is thus completed. We add that
Aerts and his coworkers have constructed similar models for arbitrary quantum
entities [33, 34, 35] which can be used to illustrate further our procedures.
6 Quantum mechanics and quantum logic
We intend to show in this section that standard QL can be recovered (up to
an equivalence relation) as the concrete logic of QM within the general clas-
sical approach sketched in Secs. 2 and 3. To this end we preliminarily state
the following fundamental axiom of QM, which establishes the mathematical
representation of states and physical properties in QM in the case of quantum
systems in which superselection rules do not occur.
Axiom QM1. Every physical system Ω is represented in QM by a triple
(H , ψ, ω), where H , ψ and ω are defined as follows.
H is a Hilbert space over the complex field C associated with the physical system
Ω.
ψ : S ∈ S 7−→ ψ(S) ∈ L1(H ),
where L1(H ) is the set of all one–dimensional subspaces of H .
ω : E ∈ E 7−→ ω(E) ∈ L (H ),
where L (H ) is the set of all closed subspaces of H .
The mappings ψ and ω are bijective.
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The following statement is then well known in QM.
Prop. 6.1. The structure (L (H ),⊂,⊥), where ⊥ is the mapping which as-
sociates every closed subspace of L (H ) with its orthogonal complement, is a
complete orthomodular lattice, which is canonically equivalent to the algebra
(L (H ),⋓,⋒,⊥) (where ⋓ and ⋒ denote the meet and join, respectively, in the
lattice (L (H ),⊂,⊥)).
The lattice (L (H ),⊂,⊥) or, equivalently, the algebra (L (H ),⋓,⋒,⊥), plays
a crucial role in standard QL. Indeed it allows us to define a lattice structure
on E by means of the following definition.
Def. 6.1. We call lattice of physical properties in QM the orthomodular lattice
(E ,∠,⊥), where ∠ denotes the order and ⊥ the orthocomplementation induced
on E, via ω, by the order ⊂ and the orthocomplementation ⊥, respectively, de-
fined on L (H ), and denote by (E ,⋓,⋒,⊥) the algebra canonically equivalent to
(E ,∠,⊥) and isomorphic to (L (H ),⋓,⋒,⊥).
We can now introduce a further lattice in QM by means of the following defini-
tion, which is standard in the foundations of QM [27].
Def. 6.2. Let E ∈ E. We call certainly yes domain of E the subset of states
SE = {S ∈ S | ψ(S) ⊂ ω(E)}
and put PE = {SE | E ∈ E}.
Indeed, the following proposition holds.
Prop. 6.2. The mapping
ρ : SE ∈ PE 7−→ ω(E) ∈ L (H )
is bijective and, for every E,F ∈ E, SE ⊂ SF iff ω(E) ⊂ ω(F ). Therefore the
structure (PE ,⊂,
⊥), where ⊥ denotes the orthocomplementation induced on PE ,
via ρ, by the orthocomplementation ⊥ defined on L (H ), is an orthomodular
lattice isomorphic to (L (H ),⊂,⊥). Then the algebra (PE ,⋓,⋒,
⊥) canonically
equivalent to (PE ,⊂,
⊥) is isomorphic to (L (H ),⋓,⋒,⊥).
We have thus singled out three isomorphic lattices, that is, (L (H ),⋓,⋒,⊥),
(E ,⋓,⋒,⊥) and (PE ,⋓,⋒,
⊥), which only differ because of their supports and
can be identified with the standard QL in the literature (which takes its name
from the interpretation of the elements of L (H ) proposed by Birkhoff and von
Neumann).
We introduce now two axioms that can be justified in QM on the basis of the
intended interpretation provided in Sec. 2. The first of them relates the math-
ematical representation in Axiom QM1 with the set–theoretical representation
of states and physical properties provided in Sec. 2.
Axiom QM2. For every E ∈ E, S ∈ S ,
ψ(S) ∈ ω(E) (equivalently, S ∈ SE) iff ext(S) ⊂ ext(E),
ψ(S) ∈ ω(E⊥) (equivalently, S ∈ SE⊥) iff ext(S) ⊂ U \ ext(E).
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Physical justification. For every physical property E there exist in QM infinitely
many states such that the quantum probability of E in each of them is neither 0
nor 1. Hence there exist preparing devices that can be used to prepare ensembles
of physical objects such that, for every ensemble, some elements display E
whenever a measurement of E is performed and some do not. It follows that
one cannot assert in QM that, for every state S and property E, a physical
object prepared by a preparing device belonging to S either possesses or does
not possess the property E. Therefore one can only characterize the sets of
states for which one of the two alternatives occur.
The last axiom then distinguishes the notion of verifiability in QM from the
notion of verifiability in CM.
Axiom QM3. The set φV (x) of all verifiable wffs of φ(x) is strictly included
in φ(x).
Physical justification. A nontrivial compatibility relation exists in QM which
prohibits testing sentences as E(x) ∧ F (x) if the physical properties E and F
are not compatible.
By using Axiom QM2 one can easily prove the following statement.
Prop. 6.3. For every α(x) ∈ φV (x) and S ∈ S ,
α(x) is C–true (C–false) in S iff S ∈ SEα (S ∈ (SEα)
⊥).
We can now introduce quantum connectives as operations on φV (x), as follows.
Def. 6.3. We call quantum negation, quantum meet and quantum join the
operations ⊥Q , ∧Q and ∨Q, respectively, on φV (x), defined as follows.
⊥Q : α(x) ∈ φV (x) 7−→ α
⊥Q(x) = E
⊥
α (x) ∈ φV (x),
∧Q : (α(x), β(x)) ∈ φV (x)×φV (x) 7−→ α(x)∧Qβ(x) = (Eα⋓Eβ)(x) ∈ φV (x),
∨Q : (α(x), β(x)) ∈ φV (x)×φV (x) 7−→ α(x)∨Qβ(x) = (Eα⋒Eβ)(x) ∈ φV (x).
The proof of the following statements is then straightforward.
Prop. 6.4. (i) For every α(x) ∈ φV (x), pα = SEα , hence PV = PE .
(ii) For every E,F ∈ E,
E = F iff E(x) ≡ F (x) iff E(x) ≈ F (x),
hence the equivalence relations ≡ and ≈ coincide on φV (x).
(iii) The quantum negation ⊥Q is a weak complementation on (φV (x),≺),
hence (φV (x),≺,
⊥Q) is the concrete logic of QM.
(iv) For every α(x) ∈ φV (x), the equivalence class [α(x)]≈ contains one and
only one wff of E(x), that is, Eα(x), hence the mapping
⊥
′
Q : [α(x)]≈ ∈ φV (x)/≈ 7−→ [α(x)]
⊥
′
Q
≈ = [α
⊥Q(x)]≈ = [E
⊥
α (x)]≈ ∈ φV (x)/≈
is well defined and bijective.
(v) The mapping
ξ : [α(x)]≈ ∈ φV (x)/≈ 7−→ pα ∈ PE
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is an order isomorphism of (φV (x)/≈,≺
′,⊥
′
Q) onto (PE ,⊂,
⊥) which maps
[α(x)]
⊥
′
Q
≈ on p
⊥
α , hence (φV (x)/≈,≺
′,⊥
′
Q) is a standard QL.
(vi) Let ∧′Q and ∨
′
Q be the operations induced by ≺
′ on φV (x)/≈. The, for
every α(x), β(x) ∈ φV (x),
[α(x) ∧Q β(x)]≈ = [(Eα ⋓ Eβ)(x)]≈ = [α(x)]≈ ∧
′
Q [β(x)]≈ = ξ
−1(pα ⋓ pβ),
[α(x) ∨Q β(x)]≈ = [(Eα ⋒ Eβ)(x)]≈ = [α(x)]≈ ∨
′
Q [β(x)]≈ = ξ
−1(pα ⋒ pβ).
Prop. 6.4, (v), shows that a standard QL can be recovered as the orthomod-
ular lattice associated with the concrete logic of QM in our classical frame-
work. Prop. 6.4, (vi), shows that the concrete logic (φV (x),≺,
⊥Q) is canoni-
cally equivalent to the algebraic structure (φV (x),
⊥Q ,∧Q,∨Q). But it must be
stressed that the wffs of φV (x) play the role of atomic wffs in the concrete logic
(φV (x),
⊥Q ,∧Q,∨Q), and that the meaning of the derived and theory–dependent
quantum connectives (which is determined by QM) must be clearly distinguished
from the meaning of classical connectives in our approach, in agreement with
the known principle of Quine, “change of logic, change of subject” [16, 36].
We have thus accomplished our task. We recall however from Sec. 1 that
our procedure for recovering standard QL can be charged to be purely formal if
one adopts the orthodox interpretation of QM. To overcome this objection we
have observed that a physical interpretation of our procedure can be given by
referring to the recent proposal of a theory (ESR model) which generalizes QM
embedding its mathematical apparatus into a broader mathematical formalism
and reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional on detection rather than
absolute [24, 25, 26]. We can be more precise here and specify that objectivity
of physical properties, which holds in the ESR model, allows one to provide,
for every E ∈ E , a physical interpretation of ext(E) as the set of all physical
objects that possess the property E independently of any measurement. This
interpretation is obviously impossible if the orthodox interpretation of quantum
probabilities is maintained.
7 The orthodox approach to standard quantum
logic
Because of the objection discussed at the end of Sec. 6, orthodox quantum
logicians avoid associating an extension with the predicates denoting physical
properties.1 Hence they introduce standard QL by adopting procedures that
are mainly based on the mathematical representation of states and effects in
QM [14, 15]. To allow a comparison with our approach we sketch in this section
an introduction to standard QL which particularizes and simplifies the methods
described in [15].
Let us consider a quantum system Ω and the notions of pure state, physical
property and physical object as defined in QM [27, 28]. Then, let us denote by
1Note that a similar objection does not occur in the case of predicates denoting states,
because the extension ext(S) of a state S ∈ S can be interpreted as the set of all physical
objects that are actually prepared in the state S.
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LQ a formal language, intended to express basic notions and relations in QM,
constructed as follows.
Def. 7.1. The alphabet of LQ consists of the following elements.
A set E = {E,F, . . .} of atomic sentences (intended interpretation: physical
properties).
Connectives ¬Q,∧Q,∨Q.
Parentheses ( , ).
Def. 7.2. The set φQ of all well formed formulas (wffs) of LQ is the set obtained
by applying recursively standard formation rules (to be precise, for every E ∈ E,
E ∈ φQ; for every α ∈ φQ, ¬Qα ∈ φQ; for every α, β ∈ φQ, α ∧Q β ∈ φQ and
α ∨Q β ∈ φQ).
Def. 7.3. By referring to the algebraic structure (PE ,⋓,⋒,
⊥) introduced in
Sec. 6, Prop. 6.2, a physical proposition pα is associated with every α ∈ φQ,
recursively defined as follows.
For every E ∈ E, pE = SE.
For every α, β ∈ φQ, p¬Qα = (pα)
⊥, pα∧Qβ = pα ⋓ pβ, pα∨Qβ = pα ⋒ pβ.
The proof of the following statements is then straightforward.
Prop. 7.1. For every α ∈ φQ there exists a unique Eα ∈ E such that pα = pEα ,
and the set PQ of all physical propositions associated with wffs of φQ coincides
with PE .
The notion of Q–truth can now be introduced by means of the following defini-
tion.
Def. 7.4. For every α ∈ φQ and S ∈ S , α is Q–true (quantum true) in S
iff S ∈ pα, α is Q–false (quantum false) in S iff S ∈ (pα)
⊥, α has no Q–truth
value (equivalently, α is Q–indeterminate) iff S /∈ pα ∪ (pα)
⊥.
One can then prove the following nontrivial statement.
Prop. 7.2. For every α ∈ φQ and S ∈ S ,
α has a Q–truth value in S iff ψ(S) ⊂ ω(Eα) ∪ (ω(Eα))
⊥ iff
the probability of the property Eα in the state S is either 1 or 0 iff
a measurement of the property Eα exists which does not modify the state S.
Proof. The first equivalence follows from Def. 7.4, Def. 6.1 and Prop. 6.2. The
second equivalence follows from the standard rules of QM. The third equivalence
is proven in [37].
Def. 7.5. The binary relations of quantum preorder ≤Q and quantum equiv-
alence ≡Q on φQ are defined by setting, for every α, β ∈ φQ,
α ≤Q β iff (for every S ∈ S , α is Q–true in S implies β is Q–true in S)
and
α ≡Q β iff (for every S ∈ S , α is Q–true in S iff β is Q–true in S).
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The proof of the following statements is then straightforward.
Prop. 7.3. (i) For every α, β ∈ φQ,
α ≤Q β iff pα ⊂ pβ iff (for every S ∈ S , β is Q–false in S implies α is
Q–false in S) iff (pβ)
⊥ ⊂ (pα)
⊥
and
α ≡Q β iff (α ≤Q β and β ≤Q α) iff pα = pβ iff (for every S ∈ S , β is
Q–false in S iff α is Q–false in S) iff (pβ)
⊥ = (pα)
⊥.
(ii) The equivalence relation ≡Q is compatible with ¬Q, ∧Q and ∨Q (to be
precise, for every α, β, γ, δ ∈ φQ, α ≡Q β implies ¬Qα ≡Q ¬Qβ, α ≡Q γ and
β ≡Q δ imply α ∧Q β ≡Q γ ∧Q δ and α ∨Q β ≡Q γ ∨Q δ).
(iii) Let ∧′Q, ∨
′
Q, ¬
′
Q denote the operations canonically induced on φQ/≡Q by
∧Q, ∨Q, ¬Q, respectively. Then, the mapping ζ : [α]≡Q ∈ φQ/≡Q 7−→ pα ∈ SEα
is an isomorphism of (φQ/≡Q ,∧
′
Q,∨
′
Q,¬
′
Q) onto (PE ,⋓,⋒,
⊥) ( standard QL).
We have thus concluded our short presentation of the orthodox approach to QL.
By comparing our general methods in Secs. 2 and 3 with this approach we can
single out some relevant similarities and differences.
(i) The language LQ is a propositional logic in which no reference is done to
individual examples of physical systems, and states are considered as possible
worlds of a Kripkean semantics, not as predicates, in the orthodox approach.
(ii) The assignment of a Q–truth value to a wff α of LQ is given resorting to
the physical proposition pα associated with α, hence it parallels the assignment
of a C–truth value to a wff α(x) of L(x) introduced in Def. 3.2 rather than the
assignment of a truth value introduced in Def. 2.3.
(iii) Prop. 7.2 shows that the definition of Q–truth introduces a verifica-
tionist notion of truth, which is considered problematic by many logicians and
philosophers [38, 39, 40, 41] and is at odds with our choice of introducing a no-
tion of truth as correspondence in Secs. 2 and 3, carefully distinguishing between
truth and verifiability. Consistently, the set PQ of all physical propositions as-
sociated with wffs of φQ coincides with the set PE of all propositions associated
with atomic wffs of φQ, which implies that only verifiable quantum sentences
have been taken into account from the very beginning when constructing LQ.
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